Culture's Open Sources: Software, Copyright, and Cultural Critique by Kelty, Christopher
Over the last two decades, there has emerged a practice of software pro-gramming and distribution which, when combined with novel uses of
intellectual property law, has come to be known as “free software” or “open
source software.” It is distinguished from other forms and practices of soft-
ware production for many reasons, but most interestingly because its practi-
tioners discuss it not simply in technical terms, but as a philosophy, a politics,
a critique, a social movement, a revolution, or even a “way of life.” For prac-
titioners, observers, and advocates who have been drawn into this net of zeit-
geisty claims, it seems to offer an answer to the 21st century question of how
we should live—or at least, how we should promise, share, code, hack,
license, lawyer, organize, buy, sell, own, sing, play, or write. More recently,
such talk has broken free of its connection to software and become common
amongst artists, writers, scientists, NGOs, and activists. It has provided them
with not only a new rhetoric, but a new set of practices concerning author-
ship, ownership, expression, speech, law, politics, and technology.
These papers are short pieces that represent new anthropological research
on these phenomena in widely disparate social spaces and global locations.1
They are meant to provoke anthropologists (even those who might be utterly
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indifferent to information technology) to pay attention to arcane technical and
legal issues and see them as no more or less arcane, and indeed no more or less
cultural than those of the Kwakiutl, the Yanomami, or the Trobrianders.
Anthropologists’ interest might be piqued, for instance, by the widespread talk
of “gift economies” amongst computer geeks or the extensive debates about pri-
vate ownership, public domains, and collectively managed commons, or the
somewhat contorted versions of the classical anthropological concepts of land-
tenure, collaborative stewardship, political representation, formal and informal
norm systems, resistance and domination, partially digested economic and evo-
lutionary theories, and a great deal of talk of culture itself.
Or, one might find compelling the portentous discussions of intellectual prop-
erty, free speech, and its relationship to technology, music downloading and its
discontents, the transparency of governments, the endlessly diverse forms of
intellectual property, and more generally, the increasingly everyday experience
of living in multiple technically-mediated worlds in which intellectual property
and software are densely intertwingled with basic activities like dating, creating,
and political agitating. As these papers demonstrate, the people and practices
analyzed here have significant relevance to many large and small theoretical
issues long of interest in anthropology and social theory more generally.
Two broad concerns connect the projects of these papers: site and critique.
First, the question of field-site has dominated discussions of late 20th centu-
ry anthropology, both because of changed conditions in the world that render
home and away grayer than ever before, and through a concern with method-
ological innovation in the very process of going, staying, participating and
returning. Research into “cyber-culture,” “online communities,” or “virtual
worlds” has promised much, but produced little that could fairly be called
exemplary long-term, detailed, and careful qualitative research into the prac-
tices ostensibly denoted by these once alluring words, much less any single
method for doing so. Most work in these areas tend to be either grand philo-
sophical ruminations on “information society” or else detailed expositions of
the subjectivity and computing practices of cyber-culture scholars. To be fair,
such attempts may be necessary prolegomena to any careful delineation of
the questions that might guide method in these areas—and given the speed
and insanity with which the technologies and practices of cyber-culture have
been trumpeted, marketed, distributed, embraced, upgraded, outdated,
rejected, and denounced, it is certainly no surprise that scholarly deliberation
on the precise nature of the conceptual problems specific to cultural and
social analysis has been left in the lurch.
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Speed and change notwithstanding, the papers collected here represent an
avowed and perhaps incorrigible commitment to long-term, intensive, and
technically detailed ethnographic fieldwork involving observation of and par-
ticipation with specific practitioners (programmers, activists, lawyers, gamers,
hackers, citizens, Peruvians, and Melanesians). Strategies for carrying this out
include hanging out with hackers on and off-line, learning to hack, learning
to write copyright licenses and reason legally, using fieldwork in Melanesia as
a foil, participating in the creation and advocacy of a nonprofit, and working
alongside political activists and software programmers in the streets of Peru
and with Maori activists online. The provocations of “multi-locale” or “multi-
site” research are answered here not by simply multiplying geographical sites,
but by disentangling the notion of site as the locus of embodied observation
from certain methodological questions that these authors consider just as rel-
evant in the regions formerly known as the West (or any novel electronically
mediated combination of East, North, West, and South) as anywhere else. All
of the papers share something of Gabriella Coleman’s sense that “the nature
of this research makes more clear that normative and ubiquitous regimes of
values, such as those posed by liberalism, science, and capitalism, have a
much more variegated expression when located in particular institutions,
social groups, or an assemblage between them,” and they proceed by looking
for and specifying differences within such regimes anywhere and at any scale.
The differences explored here are great and small, but none of them map eas-
ily onto geographical location or any classic definitions of cultural difference.
Instead they concern a host of human activities that are inherently technical
and long-since global. Most prominently, this means practices concerning
intellectual property and collective political activism. 
Second, and perhaps as result of the concern with field-site, the papers
share a commitment to extending the notion of “anthropology as cultural cri-
tique”—though in ways that are not uniform across them. At least two of the
papers (Coleman, Kelty) propose that the practices of free software and open
source programming should themselves be understood as a critique—of specif-
ic legal and political institutions—and therefore pose a conundrum regarding
the definition, goal, or desirability of a “cultural” critique on top of that.
What, specifically, is left for anthropologists to offer? Coombe and Herman, on
the other hand, are more confident that such a critique is necessary and point
to the rhetorical strategies of the various movements represented here as one
location for a more nuanced critique. In all of the cases, however, it seems
safe to say that the relation of methodology to cultural critique remains open
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and familiar: how should social scientists approach the demands for objective
analysis without falling into the critical and practical traps of co-optation or
misrecognition? How should “cultural critique” proceed if it is true that one’s
informants are already busy de-familiarizing settled practices? This issue is
especially poignant when one considers that, to date, it has been proponents
and programmers of free software themselves who have been among the
most vocal and successful in trying to explain or theorize it. When they aren’t
programming, and sometimes even when they are, many hackers evince an
affinity for proposing explanations—cultural, psychological and quasi-scien-
tific—for their own behavior. And because the practice of creating such soft-
ware (and the discourse about it) is itself conducted by email, on mailing lists,
in Internet Relay Chat channels, and on web pages, this has meant that “emic”
explanations of free software and open source are publicly available and have
been widely discussed. Such a phenomena raises the stakes for those of us
studying these practices, and demands that we not only develop a character-
ization of such practices, but somehow learn to communicate, collaborate,
argue, and write with people we can only uneasily term “informants.”
The existing research ready to greet an observer of these new phenomena
ranges from business and management theory to economics to legal scholar-
ship to psychology.2 For business and management scholars, free and open
source software represents an alternative model of software development—
one that seems to challenge the conventional wisdom of industrial organiza-
tion by allowing geographically far-flung individuals to collaborate in real-
time and with great success on large and complex software systems. For
economists and economically-minded researchers, it has generated a verita-
ble “infolanche” of speculation about the ostensible paradox of “motivation:”
why anyone would spend so much unpaid time building software only to give
it away for free online. It is here that the old anthropological standby of the
“gift economy” has been given a new treble-mortgaged lease on life as a solu-
tion to the putative problem of motivation. For lawyers and legal theorists,
free and open source software represent a new combination (a legal hack) of
copyright and contract law—one that creates a “privatized public domain” or
“commons” which has been the object of both opprobrium and advocacy.
In the end, only a handful of facts about the emergence of free software and
its ilk can be fairly characterized as uncontroversial, and it is worth situating
free software briefly, for the reader who might be unfamiliar with it. The broad
definition of free software or open source is: software whose source code (the
code humans read and write) is made freely available (generally on the inter-
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net, without restriction) through the use of a special copyright license. The soft-
ware is copyrighted by its creator and then distributed under one of several
standard licenses that allow the licensee to use the software, to distribute it, to
copy it, and even to modify it for his/her own purposes. Some licenses require
that if the software is re-distributed, any changes need to be released under
the same license used to offer it in the first place (this is variously referred to
as reciprocal, recursive, or viral). The most famous of these licenses is the GNU
General Public License created by the Free Software Foundation. 
Three salient dates usefully situate the history of free software and open
source. In 1984, Richard Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation and
provided the first copyright license, some software components and an
incomplete UNIX-derived operating system known as GNU (Gnu’s Not Unix).
Stallman’s movement often emphasizes the political aspect of freedom with
the slogan “Free as in Speech, not as in Beer.” In 1992-93 there emerged wide-
spread internet-based collaboration on an operating system using GNU soft-
ware and a kernel written by Linus Torvalds called “Linux.” Linux would go on
to be the emblem of free software in the 1990s and, combined with a free web
server called “Apache” (it was “a patchy web server”), would ultimately pose a
significant challenge to the existing proprietary software makers such as Sun,
Microsoft, IBM, and Apple (the latter two have since embraced open source
software in their own businesses). Finally 1998 saw longtime hackers Eric
Raymond and Bruce Perens propose to replace the term “free software” with
that of “open source” in order to shed some of the “political baggage” and
cash in on the manic internet economy of the late nineties. Since 1998 free
software and open source have become serious topics of study across the dis-
ciplines and, as this collection evidences, have become flashpoints for discus-
sions that extend far beyond the issues of software and copyright.
In brief, these papers address the following issues:
Gabriella Coleman’s fieldwork amongst a signature and respected set of
hackers—those working on the Debian distribution of Linux—is an excellent
place to explore the issues of politics, political disavowal, free speech, and neu-
trality. Coleman’s contribution raises one of the most interesting general ques-
tions about free software: what if writing software code is considered a kind of
speech? The question has profound implications: how do we understand writ-
ing software code as something more than an economic or technical activity? If
it is an expressive activity—one whose expressions are also literally tools—
should some forms of intellectual property rights be seen as enabling corporate
censorship? Coleman’s paper relates how the “informal politics” of everyday
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hacking (i.e., not just talking about hacking) actually serve to strategically disen-
tangle some of the more sedimented distinctions between political rights (i.e.,
free speech) and forms of property (e.g., copyrighted source code). 
Alex Golub takes seriously the challenge to compare a “traditional” anthropo-
logical subject with those of hackers, gamers, or online communities. Though he
presents it only obliquely, Golub’s primary field-site is Papua New Guinea (The
Porgera Valley of Enga). He uses his subtle sense of how identity, corporeality, and
taboo are connected in Papua New Guinea to shed light—through similarity, not
contrast—on the practices of people enmeshed in complex life-worlds of software
and intellectual property. So while taboo might be understood as a system of
norms governing the circulation and expressive use of corporeal bits and pieces—
hair, flesh, nails, etc.—in the case of the Porgera, such a description equally
makes sense of the activities of the circulation of the creative bits of information,
software code, writings created in online worlds (Golub uses the example of a new
generation of online multiplayer games). What makes the example of online
worlds significant here is that they come, more and more, to involve the use of
real money and the granting of real intellectual property rights. Intellectual prop-
erty law and norms have invaded everyday life to such an extent that they now
seem easily comparable to the complex swine-centric taboos of the Porgerans.
Golub’s paper suggests that if the Porgerans can teach us how to investigate online
gamers, then perhaps the reverse is not simply an imposition of “our” world and
values on “them,” but a methodological challenge to be faced by Melanesianists
and hacker anthropologists alike. 
Anita Chan’s paper takes the investigation of free software outside of the
Aeron chairs of Silicon Valley to the streets of Lima, Peru. She explores the emer-
gence of legislation in Peru that would require the use of free software in gov-
ernment activities, unpacking the actions of the politicians, corporate actors,
local activists, and international supporters that brought the bill to life and gave
it expressive power. She analyses how Peruvian free software advocates actively
engaged with conventional political channels and struggled to assert local poli-
tics as an entity that—like free software—is manipulable, recodable, and nec-
essarily transparent to the publics that interact with it. Chan’s essay highlights
the tensions that emerge in different national settings when free software is
treated one way online or in the US and quite differently when discussed on the
streets of Lima and amongst locally committed activists.
Christopher Kelty’s paper relates his participation with Creative Commons,
one of many “commons” projects based on free and open source software, but
aimed at covering materials other than software. He explains how—within
 
505
CHRISTOPHER KELTY
the detailed minutiae of the copyright license—notions of “culture” and “cul-
tural norms” are used strategically to help define the limits of legality. His
claim is that the strategic use of “culture” draws on, but is not strictly behold-
en to, anthropological and sociological theories of culture and cultural differ-
ence. In particular, he explores how a new generation of legal and economic
thinkers—people directly involved in the creation of Creative Commons—
have made strategic use of a “culture concept” in order to find legal and tech-
nical ways to change or influence people’s behavior. 
Rosemary Coombe and Andrew Herman recount recent events concerning
the Lego Bionicle toy line, which made use of Maori imagery and myths, and
the reaction by both Maoris and acolytes of the world of Bionicle. They use
this practical struggle, which is suffused with issues of intellectual property,
cultural autonomy, and the circulation of signs in the digital environment to
develop a critique of the global capitalist hegemony of which it is part. They
introduce the notion of the “ecumeme,” as a particular “moral space” in
which the rhetoric of intellectual property comes to reinforce itself with ever
greater success. Coombe and Herman suggest that the practices of alternative
intellectual property creation and circulation represented by free software or
Creative Commons are less alternative than the practitioners would like to
think. By exploring some of the ways in which ‘propriety’ and ‘property’ are
linked in narratives of capital and moral virtue, they suggest that the under-
standing of identity and the modes of governance implied by free software or
Creative Commons would also exclude certain “forms of communication and
sociality” such as that represented by the Bionicle example. Rather than open-
ing up any true space for alternative cultural practices, they suggest that this
alternative simply re-inscribes the same “limited liability, responsibility, and
accountability that its corporate nemesis has traditionally assumed.”
Finally, Glenn Otis Brown, Executive Director of Creative Commons, agreed
to write a brief commentary explaining the relationships between the prac-
tices of Creative Commons and the interests that anthropologists hold. In par-
ticular, he points to the gulf between current mainstream legal understand-
ings of the purpose of copyright and the emerging norms of everyday culture
visible to “norm entrepreneurs” who understand and even help shape the
attitudes and norms of a culture. Creative Commons as an endeavor sees itself
as intervening in between these two systems of laws and norms, and Brown
articulates in detail how they see their role. 
In the end, this special section aims not to circumscribe a particular sub-
field of anthropology or draw more scholars into its complicated weave, but
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to challenge cultural anthropology at large to confront the implications of
these movements and their transformations—whether it concerns intellectu-
al property (and the familiar concerns of heritage and cultural property), the
globalization of forms of information and organization into areas classically
studied in anthropology, or the nature of sovereignty and state power. While
it is easy (and increasingly risky) to constitute a field of research as “the
anthropology of...” it remains much more challenging to translate the
detailed and deliberate work of the increasingly wide range of possible spe-
cializations (especially technical ones) into a set of conceptional questions
that get at broader, shared problems. The connections here to taboo, norms,
issues of propriety, exchange, or sovereignty do more than pay lip service to
anthropology’s past concerns. They challenge not only anthropologists but
our colleagues in law, political science, economics, and sociology to see anew
the contingency and historicity of contemporary practices and to respond
from unexpected places and surprising perspectives. 
Christopher Kelty 
July 14, 2004
ENDNOTES
1These papers were first presented at the 2003 AAA meetings at Chicago on a Panel entitled
“Culture’s Open Sources” organized by Christopher Kelty and Gabriella Coleman. Thanks to
the panelists for their patience and participation and to Richard Grinker for his assistance
and encouragement.
2A representative collection of this material is available at the MIT Free/Open Source
Research Community http://opensource.mit.edu/ run by Karim Lakhani.
 
